

Christoph Bühren, “Staff Rotation as an Anti-Corruption Policy in China and in Germany: An Experimental Comparison”, Journal of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming

File	Description
German instructions stranger matching.pdf	Original instructions
Staff rotation data.dta	Raw data (Stata)
Staff rotation data.txt	Raw data
Staff rotation do file.do	Code (Stata)
Staff rotation do file.pdf	Code

Variables

round: round of the experiment (1-10)

nummer: ID nummer

Officialdummy: role of the subject (1 = public official, 0 = firm)

transfer: bribe value (How much money a firm sends to the public official)

rotationdummy: treatment dummy (1 = stranger design (staff rotation) 2 = partner design)

maledummy: gender (1 = male, 0 = female)

chinadummy: (1 = experiment in China, 0 = experiment in Germany)

transfercurrentround: bribe value (How much money a public official receives from the firm in the current round)

positivetransfer: 1 if transfer >0, 0 if transfer = 0

Choices of the public official:

reciprocity: corrupt reciprocity

opportunism: opportunistic behavior

reject: reject the bribe

report: reject and report the bribe