peer effects in binary outcomes: strategic complementarity and taste for conformity with endogenous networks (replication data)

This paper introduces a generalized model of peer effects for binary outcomes, based on a network game that accounts for strategic complementarity (influence of the number of peers that select the same action) and conformity to social norms (penalizing deviations from the average peers’ action). We derive conditions for a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium under rational expectations about peers’ behavior. Unobserved individual heterogeneity affecting network formation and peer effects is addressed nonparametrically using a control function nested pseudo likelihood estimator, whose asymptotic properties are established. The model is applied to microfinance participation in India.

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Suggested Citation

Lambotte, Mathieu (2025): Peer Effects in Binary Outcomes: Strategic Complementarity and Taste for Conformity with Endogenous Networks (replication data). Version: 1.0. Journal of Applied Econometrics. Dataset. http://dx.doi.org/10.15456/jae.2025086.1303778166

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