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Quantifying the supply-side benefits from forward contracting in wholesale el...
The assumption of expected profit-maximizing bidding behavior in a multi-unit, multi-period auction with step-function supply curves is used to estimate cost functions for... -
An empirical model of the multi-unit, sequential, clock auction (replication ...
We construct a model of participation and bidding at multi-unit, sequential, clock auctions when bidders have multi-unit demand. We describe conditions sufficient to... -
Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values (replication...
Collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games. A major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are... -
Posterior odds comparison of a symmetric low-price, sealed-bid auction within...
I attempt to decide, using the posterior odds ratio, whether the symmetric common-value paradigm or the symmetric independent-private-values paradigm is a more probable...
