sym.f
Creators:
Olivier Armantier
;
Jean-Pierre Florens
;
Jean-François Richard
From the dataset abstract
We define a new concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also...
Source: Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games (replication data)
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Metadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Format | f |
| License | CC-BY 4.0 |
| URL | https://journaldata.zbw.eu/dataset/edbe198c-75e1-492c-a418-1833501f7b52/resource/cd4070c2-208f-48c4-a5ac-efe26a943d5d/download/sym.f |
| Last updated | November 15, 2022 |
| Created | November 15, 2022 |
